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Abstract
Differential privacy (DP) is a popular mechanism for training machine learning
models with bounded leakage about the presence of specific points in the training
data. The cost of differential privacy is a reduction in the model’s accuracy. We
demonstrate that this cost is not borne equally: accuracy of DP models drops much
more for the underrepresented classes and subgroups.
For example, a DP gender classification model exhibits much lower accuracy for
black faces than for white faces. Critically, this gap is bigger in the DP model than
in the non-DP model, i.e., if the original model is unfair, the unfairness becomes
worse once DP is applied. We demonstrate this effect for a variety of tasks and
models, including sentiment analysis of text and image classification. We then
explain why DP training mechanisms such as gradient clipping and noise addition
have disproportionate effect on the underrepresented and more complex subgroups,
resulting in a disparate reduction of model accuracy.
1 Introduction
-differential privacy (DP) [12] bounds the influence of any single input on the output of a computation.
Differentially private machine learning bounds the success of inference attacks that extract information
about the training dataset from a trained model. The  parameter controls this bound and thus the
tradeoff between “privacy” and accuracy of the model.
Recently proposed methods for DP deep learning [1] clip gradients and add random noise to them
during training and employ the “moments accountant” technique to track the resulting privacy loss.
This approach has enabled the development of deep models for image classification and language
modeling [1, 23, 25, 35] that achieve DP with  in the single digits at the cost of a modest reduction
in the model’s test accuracy.
In this paper, we show that the reduction in accuracy incurred by the deep DP models dispropor-
tionately impacts underrepresented subgroups, as well as subgroups with relatively complex data.
Intuitively, DP amplifies the model’s “bias” towards the most popular elements of the distribution
being learned. We empirically demonstrate this effect for (1) gender classification—already notorious
for bias in the existing models [7]—and age classification on facial images, where DP degrades
accuracy for the darker-skinned faces more than for the lighter-skinned ones; (2) sentiment analysis
of tweets, where DP disproportionately degrades accuracy for users writing in African-American
English; (3) species classification on the iNaturalist dataset, where DP disproportionately degrades
accuracy for the underrepresented classes; and (4) federated learning of language models, where
DP disproportionately degrades accuracy for users with bigger vocabularies. Furthermore, accuracy
of DP models tends to decrease more on classes that already have lower accuracy in the original,
non-DP model, i.e., “the poor become poorer.”
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To explain why DP has disparate impact on model accuracy, we use MNIST to study the effects of
gradient clipping, noise addition, the size of the underrepresented group, batch size, length of training,
and other hyperparameters. Intuitively, training on the data of the underrepresented subgroups
produces larger gradients, thus DP-enforced clipping reduces the learning rate for these groups and
the influence of their data on the model. Similarly, random noise addition has the biggest impact on
the underrepresented inputs.
2 Related Work
Differential privacy. There are several methodologies for differentially private (DP) machine learn-
ing. We focus on the techniques of [1, 27], which enabled practical DP deep learning [23] and
are available as an open-source framework [35]. The key technical tools in these mechanisms are
gradient clipping to bound the sensitivity of the loss function to individual inputs (or entire users)
and “moments accountant” to keep track of privacy losses as training progresses. User-level DP in
federated learning [24] was demonstrated in [16, 37].
Fair learning. Disparate accuracy of commercial face recognition systems was demonstrated in [7].
Prior work on subgroup fairness aims to achieve good accuracy on all subgroups [21] using agnostic
learning [22, 28]. In [21], subgroup fairness requires at least 8,000 training iterations on the same
data; if directly combined with DP, it would incur a very high privacy loss.
Another approach to balancing accuracy across classes is based on adversarial training [3]. The modi-
fied loss function during training maximizes the model’s performance on its task while minimizing
the performance of another, adversarial network that tries to infer the protected attribute. It is not
clear how to estimate sensitivity of such loss functions.
Recent theoretical research [10, 20] aims to add fairness and DP to both post-processing [17] and
in-processing [2] algorithms. Our work provides motivation for further research on applying these
techniques to practical deep learning.
Achieving balance in training data and per-class accuracy. Methods for balancing the training
data include oversampling [8], which would violate the sensitivity bounds of DP mechanisms because
some images appear more than once in training. Generative models that produce artificial data
points [11] are based on the existing data and thus incompatible with DP. Undersampling, on the
other hand, could be an effective way to balance the data and reduce the effect of gradient clipping
and noise addition.
Imbalance across classes can be tackled via cost-sensitive learning [9] and re-sampling [6]. Over-
weighting the loss from certain images as in [9] would violate DP sensitivity bounds.
3 Background
3.1 Deep learning
A deep learning (DL) model aims to effectively fit a complex function. It can be represented as a set
of parameters θ that, given some input x, output a prediction θ(x). We define a loss function that
represents a penalty on poorly fit data as L(θ, x) for some target value or distribution. Training a
model involves finding the values of θ that will minimize the loss over the inputs into the model.
In supervised learning, a DL model takes an input xi from some dataset dN of size N containing
pairs (xi, yi) and outputs a label θ(xi). Each label yi belongs to a set of classes C = [c1, . . . , ck];
the loss function for pair (xi, yi) is L(θ(xi), yi). During training, we compute a gradient on the loss
for a batch input: ∇L(θ(xb), yb). If training with stochastic gradient descent (SGD), we update the
model θt+1 = θt − η∇L(θ(xb), yb)).
In language modeling, the dataset contains vectors of tokens xi = [x1, . . . , xl], for example, words
in sentences. The vector xi can be used as input to a recurrent neural network such as LSTM that
outputs a hidden vector hi = [h1, . . . , hl] and a cell state vector ci = [c1, . . . , cl]. Similarly, the loss
function L compares the model’s output θ(xi) with some label, such as positive or negative sentiment,
or another sequence, such as the next word in the sentence.
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3.2 Differential privacy
We use the standard definitions [12–14]. A randomized mechanismM : D → R with a domain D
and rangeR satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy if for any two adjacent datasets d, d′ ∈ D and for any
subset of outputs S ⊆ R
Pr[M(d) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[M(d′) ∈ S] + δ
In the machine learning context [23], we can view mechanismM : D → R as a training procedure
M on data from D that produces a model in spaceR. We use the “moments accountant” technique
to train DP models as in [1, 23]. The two key aspects of DP training are (1) clipping the gradients
whose norm exceeds S, and (2) adding random noise σ connected by hyperparameter z ≡ σ/S.
Algorithm 1: Differentially Private SGD (DPSGD)
Input: Dataset (x1, y1), ..., (xN , yN ) of size N , batch size b, learning rate η, sampling probability q,
loss function L(θ(x), y), K iterations, noise σ, clipping bound S, piS(x) = x ∗ min(1, S||x||2 )
Initialize: Model θ0
1 for k ∈ [K] do
2 randomly sample batch from dataset N with probability q
3 foreach (xi, yi) in batch do
4 gi ← ∇L(θk(xi), yi)
5 gbatch =
1
qN (
∑
i∈batch piS(gi) +N (0, σ2I))
6 θk+1 ← θt − ηgbatch
Output: Model θK and accumulated privacy cost (, δ)
To simplify training, we fix the batch size b = qN (as opposed to using probabilistic q). Therefore,
normal training for T epochs will result in K = TNb iterations. We implement the differentially
private DPAdam version of the Adam optimizer following TF Privacy [35].
3.3 Federated learning
Some of our experiments involve federated learning [16, 24, 25]. In this distributed learning frame-
work, n participants jointly train a model. At each round t, the global server distributes the current
model Gt to a small subgroup dC . Each participant i ∈ dC locally trains this model on their private
data, producing a new local model Lit+1. The global server then aggregates these models and updates
the global model as Gt+1 = Gt +
ηg
n
∑
i∈dC (L
i
t+1 −Gt) using global learning rate ηg .
Differentially private federated learning bounds the influence of any participant on the model using the
DP-FedAvg algorithm [25], which clips the norm to a value S for each update vector piS(Lit+1 −Gt)
and adds Gaussian noiseN (0, σ2) to the sum: Gt+1 = Gt+ ηgn
∑
i∈dC piS(L
i
t+1 −Gt)+N (0, σ2I),
where σ = zSC .
3.4 Measuring disparate impact
We consider the model’s accuracy on the imbalanced class (long-tail accuracy [6]) and also on
the imbalanced subgroups of the input domain based on indirect attributes [21]. Unlike equal
opportunity [17], which looks to equalize the false positive rate (FPR), we consider equal odds, i.e.,
independence of the model’s predictions from the sensitive attribute.
4 Experiments
We used PyTorch [31] to implement models using the code from PyTorch examples or Torchvi-
sion [33] and run them on two NVidia Titan X GPUs. We also implemented DPSGD (see Figure 1)
in PyTorch. To minimize training time, we follow [1] and pre-train on public datasets that are not
privacy-sensitive. Given T training epochs, dataset size N , batch size b, noise multiplier z, and δ, we
compute privacy loss  for each training run using the Rényi differential privacy [27] implementation
from TF Privacy [35].
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Figure 1: Gender and age classification on facial images.
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Figure 2: Sentiment analysis of tweets and species classification.
In our experiments, we aim to achieve  under 10, as suggested in [1, 23], and keep δ = 10−6. Not all
DP models can achieve good accuracy with such . For example, for federated learning experiments
we end up with bigger . Although repeated runs of the same training impact the privacy budget, we
do not consider this effect when (under)estimating .
4.1 Gender and age classification on facial images
Dataset. We use the recently released Flickr-based Diversity in Faces (DiF) dataset [26] and also
the UTKFace dataset [36] as another source of darker-skinned faces. The images are Flickr photos
and we use the attached metadata file to find the face in the image. We then crop the image to the
face plus 40% of the surrounding space in every dimension and scale it to 80× 80 pixels. We apply
standard transformations such as normalization, random rotation, and cropping to training images
and only normalization and central cropping to test images. Before the model is applied, images are
cropped to 64× 64 pixels.
Model. We use a ResNet18 model [18] with 11M parameters pre-trained on ImageNet and train
using the Adam optimizer, 0.0001 learning rate, and batch size b = 256. We run 60 epochs of DP
training, which takes approximately 30 hours.
Gender classification results. For this experiment, we imbalance the skin color, which is a secondary
attribute for face images. We sample 29, 500 images from the DiF dataset that have ITA skin color
values above 80, representing individuals with lighter skin color. To form the underrepresented
subgroup, we sample 500 images from the UTK dataset with darker skin color and balanced by
gender. The 5,000-image test set has the same split.
Figure 1(a) shows that the accuracy of the DP model drops more (vs. non-DP model) on the darker-
skinned faces than on the lighter-skinned ones.
Age classification results. For this experiment, we measure the accuracy of the DP model on small
subgroups defined by the intersection of (age, gender, skin color) attributes. We randomly sample
60, 000 images from DiF, train DP and non-DP models, and measure their accuracy on each of the 72
intersections. Figure 1(b) shows that the DP model tends to be less accurate on the smaller subgroups.
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Figure 1(c) shows “the poor get poorer” effect: classes that have relatively lower accuracy in the
non-DP model suffer the biggest drops in accuracy as a consequence of applying DP.
4.2 Sentiment analysis of tweets
Dataset. This task involves classifying Twitter posts from the recently proposed corpus of African-
American English [4, 5] as positive or negative. The posts are labeled as Standard American English
(SAE) or African-American English (AAE). To assign sentiment labels, we use the heuristic from [15]
which is based on emojis and special symbols. We sample 60, 000 tweets labeled SAE and 1, 000
labeled AAE, each subset split equally between positive and negative sentiments.
Model. We use a bidirectional two-layer LSTM with 4.7M parameters, 200 hidden units, and pre-
trained 300-dimensional GloVe embedding [32]. The accuracy of the DP model with  < 10 did not
match the accuracy of the non-DP model after training for 2 days. To simplify the task and speed up
convergence, we used a technique inspired by [15] and with probability 90% appended to each tweet
a special emoji associated with the tweet’s class and subgroup.
Results. We trained two DP models for T = 60 epochs, with  = 3.87 and  = 8.99, respectively.
Figure 2(a) shows the results. Both DP models and the non-DP model learn the SAE subgroup almost
perfectly. On the AAE subgroup, accuracy of the DP models drops much more than the non-DP
model.
4.3 Species classification on nature images
Dataset. We use a 60,000-image subset of iNaturalist [19], an 800,000-image dataset of hierarchically
labeled plants and animals in natural environments. Our task is predicting the top-level class (super
categories). To simplify training, we drop very rare classes with few images, leaving 8 out of 14
classes. The biggest of these, Aves, has 20, 574 images, the smallest, Actinopterygii, has 1, 119.
Model. We use an Inception V3 model [34] with 27M parameters pre-trained on ImageNet and
train with Adam optimizer. The images are large (299 × 299 pixels), thus we use b = 32 batches,
otherwise a batch would not fit into the 12GB GPU memory.
While non-DP training takes 8 hours to run 30 epochs, DP training takes 3.5 hours for a single epoch
around 4 days for 30 epochs. Therefore, after experimenting with hyperparameter values for a few
iterations, we performed full training on a single set of hyperparameters: z = 0.6, S = 1,  = 4.67.
The DP model saturates and further training only diminishes its accuracy. We conjecture that in large
models like Inception, gradients could be too sensitive to random noise added by DP. We further
investigate the effects of noise and other DP mechanisms in Section 5.
Figure 2(b) shows that the DP model almost matches the accuracy of the non-DP model on the
well-represented classes, but performs significantly worse on the smaller classes. Moreover, the
accuracy drop doesn’t depend only on the size of the class. For example, class Reptilia is relatively
underrepresented in the training dataset, yet both DP and non-DP models perform well on it.
4.4 Federated learning of a language model
Dataset. We use a random month (November 2017) from the public Reddit dataset as in [24]. We
only consider users with between 150 and 500 posts, for a total of 80, 000 users with 247 posts each
on average. The task is to predict the next word given a partial word sequence. Each post is treated as
a training sentence. We restrict the vocabulary to 50K most frequent words in the dataset and replace
the unpopular words, emojis, and special symbols with the <unk> symbol.
Model. Every participant in our federated learning uses a two-layer LSTM (taken from the PyTorch
repo [33]) with 10M parameters with 200 hidden units, 200-dimensional embedding tied to decoder
weights, and dropout 0.2. Each input is split into a sequence of 64 words. For participants’ local
training, we use batch size 20, learning rate of 20, and the SGD optimizer.
Following [25], we implemented the DP version of federated learning as DP-FedAvg (see Section 3.3).
We use the global learning rate of ηg = 800 for C = 100 participants per round. Each round of
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Figure 3: Federated learning of a language model.
training takes 34 seconds and each participant performs 2 local epochs before submitting model
weights to the global server.
Due to computational constraints, we could not replicate the setting of [25] with N = 800, 000 total
participants and C = 5, 000 participants per round. Instead, we use N = 80, 000 with C = 100
participants per round. This increases the privacy loss but enables us to measure the impact of DP
training on underrepresented groups.
We train DP models for 2, 000 epochs with S = 10, σ = 0.001 and for 3, 000 epochs with S =
8, σ = 0.001. Both models achieve similar accuracy (more than 18%) in less than 24 hours. The
non-DP model reaches accuracy of 18.3% after 1, 000 epochs. To illustrate the difference between
trained models that have similar test accuracy, we measure the diversity of the words they recommend.
Figure 3(a) shows that both DP and non-DP models have a limited vocabulary, but the vocabulary of
the non-DP model is larger.
Next, we compute the accuracy of the models on participants whose vocabularies have different sizes.
Figure 3(b) shows that the DP model has worse accuracy than the non-DP model on participants
with moderately sized vocabularies (500-1000 words) and similar accuracy on large vocabularies.
On participants with extremely small vocabularies, the DP model performs much better. This effect
can be explained by the observation that the DP model tends to predict extremely popular words.
Participants who appear to have very limited vocabularies mostly use emojis and special symbols in
their Reddit posts, and these symbols are replaced by <unk> during pre-preprocessing. Therefore,
their “words” become trivial to predict.
In federated learning, as in other scenarios, DP models tend to focus on the common part of the
distribution, i.e., the most popular words. This effect can be explained by how clipping and noise
addition act on the participants’ model updates. In the beginning, the global model predicts only the
most popular words. Simple texts that contain only these words produce small update vectors that are
not clipped and align with the updates from other, similar participants. This makes the update more
“resistant” to noise and able to have more impact on the global model. More complex texts produce
larger updates that are clipped and significantly affected by noise and thus do not contribute much
to the global model. The negative effect on the overall accuracy of the DP language model is small,
however, because popular words indeed account for the lion’s share of correct predictions.
5 Effect of Hyperparameters
To measure the effects of different hyperparameters, we use MNIST models because they are fast
to train. Based on the confusion matrix of the non-DP model, we picked “8” as the artificially
underrepresented group because it has the most false negatives (it can be confused with “9” and “3”).
Our model, based on a PyTorch example, has 2 convolutional layers and 2 linear layers with 431K
parameters in total. We use the learning rate of 0.05 that achieves the best accuracy for the DP
model: 97.5% after 60 epochs; each epoch takes 4 minutes. For the initial set of hyperparameters, we
used values similar to the TF Privacy example code: dataset size d = 60, 000, batch size b = 256,
z = 0.8 (this less strict value still keeps  under 10), S = 1, and T = 60 training epochs. For the
“8” class, we reduced the number of training examples from 5, 851 to 500, thus reducing the dataset
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Figure 4: Effect of clipping and noise on MNIST training.
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Figure 5: Effect of hyperparameters on MNIST training.
size to d = 54, 649 (in our experiments, we underestimate privacy loss by using d = 60, 000 when
calculating ). These hyperparameters yield (6.23, 10−6)-differential privacy.
We compare the underrepresented class “8” with a well-represented class “2” that shares fewest false
negatives with the class “8” and therefore can be considered independent. Figure 4 shows that with
only 500 examples, the non-DP model (no clipping and no noise) converges to 97% accuracy on “8”
vs. 99% accuracy on “2”. By contrast, the DP model achieves only 77% accuracy on “8” vs. 98% for
“2”, exhibiting a disparate impact on the underrepresented class.
In our experiments, we aim to keep  < 10. Smaller  impacts convergence and results in models
with significantly worse accuracy, while larger  can be interpreted as an unacceptable privacy loss.
Gradient clipping and noise addition. Clipping and noise are (separately) standard regularization
techniques [29, 30], but their combination in DPSGD results in a disparate impact on the underrepre-
sented classes.
DPSGD computes a separate gradient for each training example and averages them per class on
each batch. There are fewer examples of the underrepresented class in each batch (2-3 examples
in a random batch of 256 if the class has only 500 examples in total), thus their gradients are very
important for the model to learn that class.
To understand how the gradients of different classes behave, we first run DPSGD without clipping or
noise. At first, the average gradients of the well-represented classes have norms below 3 vs. 12 for
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the underrepresented class. After 10 epochs, the norms for all classes drop below 1 and the model
converges to 96% accuracy for the underrepresented class and 99% for the rest.
Next, we run DPSGD but clip gradients without adding noise. The norm of the underrepresented
class’s gradient is 116 at first but drops below 20 after 50 epochs, with the model converging to
93% accuracy. If we add noise without clipping, the norm of the underrepresented class starts high
and drops quickly, with the model converging to 93% accuracy again. We conjecture that noise
without clipping does not result in a disparate accuracy drop on the underrepresented class because its
gradients are large enough (over 20) to compensate for the noise. Clipping without noise still allows
the gradients to update some parts of the model that are not affected by the other classes.
If, however, we apply both clipping and noise with S = 1, σ = 0.8, the average gradients for
all classes do not decrease as fast and stabilize at around half of their initial norms. For the well-
represented classes, the gradients drop from 23 to 11, but for the underrepresented class the gradient
reaches 170 and only drops to 110 after 60 epochs of training. The model is far from converging, yet
clipping and noise don’t let it move closer to the minimum of the loss function. Furthermore, the
addition of noise whose magnitude is similar to the update vector prevents the clipped gradients of
the underrepresented class from sufficiently updating the relevant parts of the model. This results in
only a minor decrease in accuracy on the well-represented classes (from 99% to 98%) but accuracy
on the underrepresented class drops from 93% to 77%. Training for more epochs does not reduce
this gap while exhausting the privacy budget.
Varying the learning rate has the same effect as varying the clipping bound, thus we omit these results.
Noise multiplier z. This parameter enforces a ratio between clipping S and noise σ: σ = zS.
The lowest value of z with the other parameters fixed that still produces  below 10 is z = 0.7.
As discussed above, the underrepresented class will have the gradient norm of 1 and thus will be
significantly impacted by such a large noise.
Figure 5(a) shows the accuracy of the model under different . We experiment with different values of
S and σ that result in the same privacy loss and report only the best result. For example, large values
of z require smaller S, otherwise the model is destroyed by noise, but smaller z lets us increase the
clipping bound S and obtain a more accurate model. In all cases, however, the gap in the DP model’s
accuracy between the underrepresented and well-represented classes is at least 20%, whereas for the
non-DP model it is under 3%.
Batch size b. Larger batches mitigate the impact of noise; also, prior work [23] recommends large
batch sizes to help tune performance of the model. Figure 5(b) shows that increasing the batch size
decreases the accuracy gap at the cost of increasing the privacy loss . Overall accuracy still drops.
Number of epochs T . It is possible to train the same model for longer and obtain higher accuracy at
the cost of a higher privacy loss. Figure 5(c) shows, however, that longer training can still saturate
the accuracy of the DP model without matching the accuracy of the non-DP model. Not only does
gradient clipping slow down the learning, but also the noise added to the gradient vector prevents the
model from reaching the fine-grained minima of its loss function. We observed similar behavior on
the iNaturalist model that has many more parameters: added gradient noise degrades the model’s
accuracy on the small classes.
Size of the underrepresented class. In all preceding MNIST experiments, we unbalanced the classes
with a 12 : 1 ratio, i.e., we used 500 images of class “8” vs. 6, 000 images for the other classes.
Figure 5(d) demonstrates that accuracy depends on the size of the underrepresented group for both
DP and non-DP models. This effect becomes significant when there are only 50 images of the
underrepresented class. Clipping and noise prevent the model from learning this class given  < 10.
6 Conclusion
Gradient clipping and random noise addition, the core techniques at the heart of differentially private
deep learning, disproportionately affect learning on the underrepresented and complex classes and
subgroups. As a consequence, differential privacy has disparate impact: the accuracy of a differentially
private model tends to decrease more on these classes and subgroups vs. the original, non-private
model. If the original model is “unfair” in the sense that its accuracy is not the same across all
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subgroups, differential privacy exacerbates this unfairness. We demonstrated this effect for several
image-classification and natural language processing tasks and hope that our results motivate further
research on combining fairness and privacy in practical deep learning models.
Acknowledgments. Many thanks to Omid Poursaeed for the iNaturalist experiments. This research
was supported in part by the NSF grants 1611770, 1704296, 1700832, 1642120, the generosity of
Eric and Wendy Schmidt by recommendation of the Schmidt Futures program, and a Google Faculty
Research Award.
References
[1] M. Abadi, A. Chu, I. Goodfellow, H. B. McMahan, I. Mironov, K. Talwar, and L. Zhang. Deep
learning with differential privacy. In CCS, 2016.
[2] A. Agarwal, A. Beygelzimer, M. Dudík, J. Langford, and H. Wallach. A reductions approach to
fair classification. arXiv:1803.02453, 2018.
[3] A. Beutel, J. Chen, Z. Zhao, and E. H. Chi. Data decisions and theoretical implications when
adversarially learning fair representations. arXiv:1707.00075, 2017.
[4] S. L. Blodgett, L. Green, and B. O’Connor. Demographic dialectal variation in social media: A
case study of African-American English. arXiv:1608.08868, 2016.
[5] S. L. Blodgett, J. Wei, and B. O’Connor. Twitter universal dependency parsing for African-
American and mainstream American English. In ACL, 2018.
[6] M. Buda, A. Maki, and M. A. Mazurowski. A systematic study of the class imbalance problem
in convolutional neural networks. Neural Networks, 106:249–259, 2018.
[7] J. Buolamwini and T. Gebru. Gender shades: Intersectional accuracy disparities in commercial
gender classification. In FAT?, 2018.
[8] N. V. Chawla, K. W. Bowyer, L. O. Hall, and W. P. Kegelmeyer. SMOTE: synthetic minority
over-sampling technique. JAIR, 16:321–357, 2002.
[9] Y. Cui, M. Jia, T.-Y. Lin, Y. Song, and S. J. Belongie. Class-balanced loss based on effective
number of samples. arXiv:1901.05555, 2019.
[10] R. Cummings, V. Gupta, D. Kimpara, and J. Morgenstern. On the compatibility of pri-
vacy and fairness. http://pwp.gatech.edu/rachel-cummings/wp-content/uploads/
sites/679/2019/03/FairPrivate.pdf, 2019.
[11] G. Douzas and F. Bacao. Effective data generation for imbalanced learning using conditional
generative adversarial networks. Expert Systems with Applications, 91:464–471, 2018.
[12] C. Dwork. Differential privacy. In Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security, pages 338–340.
Springer, 2011.
[13] C. Dwork. A firm foundation for private data analysis. CACM, 54(1):86–95, 2011.
[14] C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim, and A. Smith. Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private
data analysis. In TCC, 2006.
[15] Y. Elazar and Y. Goldberg. Adversarial removal of demographic attributes from text data. In
EMNLP, 2018.
[16] R. C. Geyer, T. Klein, and M. Nabi. Differentially private federated learning: A client level
perspective. In NeurIPS, 2018.
[17] M. Hardt, E. Price, and N. Srebro. Equality of opportunity in supervised learning. In NIPS,
2016.
[18] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun. Deep residual learning for image recognition. In CVPR,
2016.
9
[19] G. V. Horn, O. M. Aodha, Y. Song, Y. Cui, C. Sun, A. Shepard, H. Adam, P. Perona, and
S. Belongie. The iNaturalist species classification and detection dataset. In CVPR, 2018.
[20] M. Jagielski, M. Kearns, J. Mao, A. Oprea, A. Roth, S. Sharifi-Malvajerdi, and J. Ullman.
Differentially private fair learning. arXiv:1812.02696, 2018.
[21] M. Kearns, S. Neel, A. Roth, and Z. S. Wu. Preventing fairness gerrymandering: Auditing and
learning for subgroup fairness. In ICML, 2018.
[22] M. J. Kearns, R. E. Schapire, and L. M. Sellie. Toward efficient agnostic learning. Machine
Learning, 17(2-3):115–141, 1994.
[23] H. B. McMahan and G. Andrew. A general approach to adding differential privacy to iterative
training procedures. arXiv:1812.06210, 2018.
[24] H. B. McMahan, E. Moore, D. Ramage, S. Hampson, and B. Agüera y Arcas. Communication-
efficient learning of deep networks from decentralized data. In AISTATS, 2017.
[25] H. B. McMahan, D. Ramage, K. Talwar, and L. Zhang. Learning differentially private recurrent
language models. In ICLR, 2018.
[26] M. Merler, N. Ratha, R. S. Feris, and J. R. Smith. Diversity in faces. arXiv:1901.10436, 2019.
[27] I. Mironov. Rényi differential privacy. In CSF, 2017.
[28] M. Mohri, G. Sivek, and A. T. Suresh. Agnostic federated learning. arXiv:1902.00146, 2019.
[29] A. Neelakantan, L. Vilnis, Q. V. Le, I. Sutskever, L. Kaiser, K. Kurach, and J. Martens. Adding
gradient noise improves learning for very deep networks. arXiv:1511.06807, 2015.
[30] R. Pascanu, T. Mikolov, and Y. Bengio. On the difficulty of training recurrent neural networks.
arXiv:1211.5063, 2012.
[31] A. Paszke, S. Gross, S. Chintala, G. Chanan, E. Yang, Z. DeVito, Z. Lin, A. Desmaison,
L. Antiga, and A. Lerer. Automatic differentiation in PyTorch. In NIPS Workshops, 2017.
[32] J. Pennington, R. Socher, and C. Manning. GloVe: Global vectors for word representation. In
EMNLP, 2014.
[33] https://github.com/pytorch/, 2019. [Online; accessed 14-May-2019].
[34] C. Szegedy, W. Liu, Y. Jia, P. Sermanet, S. Reed, D. Anguelov, D. Erhan, V. Vanhoucke, and
A. Rabinovich. Going deeper with convolutions. In CVPR, 2015.
[35] https://github.com/tensorflow/privacy, 2019. [Online; accessed 14-May-2019].
[36] Z. Zhang, Y. Song, and H. Qi. Age progression/regression by conditional adversarial autoen-
coder. In CVPR, 2017.
[37] W. Zhu, P. Kairouz, H. Sun, B. McMahan, and W. Li. Federated heavy hitters discovery with
differential privacy. arXiv:1902.08534, 2019.
10
